IC-3: Ireland’s strategic positioning in Europe’s semiconductor reconfiguration

The launch of IC-3 (Ireland’s Chips Competence Centre) marks a significant evolution in Ireland’s semiconductor strategy. It is not merely an ecosystem initiative. It reflects Ireland’s positioning within a broader European industrial reconfiguration in which semiconductors have become central to economic security, digital infrastructure, defence capability and the green transition.

Across Europe, semiconductor policy has moved from innovation support to strategic industrial architecture. The European Chips Act formalised this shift, but its effectiveness depends on how Member States translate framework into execution. IC-3 is Ireland’s institutional response to that challenge.

IC-3 as Ireland’s execution interface within the European Chips architecture

Under the European Chips Act, each Member State is expected to establish a competence centre capable of supporting design enablement, pilot-line access, technology maturation and skills development. These centres are conceived as operational bridges between national ecosystems and EU-level infrastructures.

IC-3 was created following a national call and is operated by a consortium bringing together Tyndall National Institute (via University College Cork), MIDAS and University College Dublin. It is aligned with the Chips Joint Undertaking framework, with national co-funding matched by EU resources.

Its strategic function is threefold.

First, it anchors Ireland within the European pilot-line infrastructure. Pilot lines are pre-commercial environments designed to de-risk technologies before industrial deployment. Access to such infrastructures determines whether research outputs can realistically progress toward production within Europe.

Second, IC-3 lowers structural barriers for SMEs and start-ups. Semiconductor innovation is capital intensive and technologically complex. Structured access to design tools, process validation environments and European networks changes the participation landscape.

Third, it provides coordination. Semiconductor value chains require synchronisation across materials, design, fabrication, packaging and system integration. A competence centre makes the ecosystem legible and navigable.

Ireland’s semiconductor cluster already employs more than 20,000 people and generates over €13 billion in exports annually. Much of this footprint has developed through sustained multinational investment, including major US semiconductor firms embedded in global supply chains.

European industrial policy does not aim to displace that presence. The strategic objective is to increase the proportion of advanced R&D, integration capability and value-chain depth anchored within Europe. IC-3 strengthens Ireland’s ability to operate not only as a manufacturing host, but as an active participant in European capability-building.

European sovereignty as distributed capability

Europe’s semiconductor challenge is structural. Imports remain high and the trade deficit underscores systemic exposure. The Chips Act, Horizon Europe and IPCEIs form a coordinated response designed to reinforce Europe’s internal capacity.

However, sovereignty in semiconductors does not equate to national self-sufficiency. It depends on distributed but connected strengths across Member States.

Ireland’s model combines a concentrated industrial footprint, strong multinational integration and a newly reinforced coordination layer through IC-3. France represents another complementary model. Its semiconductor ecosystem combines production capacity, upstream research excellence and structured cluster governance.

In particular, the Grenoble ecosystem structured around Minalogic integrates research institutes, start-ups, SMEs and major industrial players across microelectronics, photonics and deeptech hardware. French actors such as CEA-Leti, CNRS, STMicroelectronics and Soitec illustrate the depth of France’s research-to-industry pipeline.

France’s recent semiconductor roadmap reinforced priorities in advanced nodes, power electronics, packaging capability expansion and talent acceleration, aligned with European instruments and IPCEI participation.

Seen from Ireland, this is not a comparison but a complementarity dynamic.

Ireland offers agility, design integration, pilot-line engagement capacity and strong multinational anchoring. France offers industrial structuring depth, advanced materials expertise and experience in orchestrating large-scale European projects. Both operate within the same EU regulatory and funding architecture.

The multinational dimension and European anchoring

Ireland’s semiconductor ecosystem is deeply integrated into global supply chains, particularly through US multinational investments. This is sometimes presented as a constraint in sovereignty discussions. In reality, it can become a strategic advantage if properly articulated with European policy instruments.

Multinational sites generate high-skilled labour pools, supplier networks and advanced process expertise. The policy question is how to connect these assets to European capability-building mechanisms.

IC-3 strengthens that articulation. By facilitating access to pilot lines, design platforms and EU consortium-building mechanisms, it increases the likelihood that innovation occurring within or around multinational environments contributes to European projects and value creation.

European sovereignty does not imply isolation from global actors. It implies retaining control and capacity in critical design, validation and scaling stages. Ireland’s integration of multinational presence with EU-aligned coordination reflects that pragmatic approach.

From infrastructure to cooperation: possible avenues between Ireland and France

Within this architecture, several cooperation pathways emerge naturally.

At research level, structured collaboration between Tyndall, UCC and UCD on the Irish side and actors such as CEA-Leti, CNRS and Minalogic-affiliated institutions on the French side could focus on advanced packaging, heterogeneous integration, power electronics and integrated photonics. Participation in shared European pilot lines provides an immediate institutional framework for such cooperation.

At industrial level, Ireland’s strong design and multinational manufacturing environment could connect more systematically with French upstream materials and integration ecosystems, including companies such as STMicroelectronics and Soitec. Advanced packaging — increasingly recognised as a strategic gap for Europe — offers a particularly promising domain for alignment.

Financing provides another lever. France has mobilised dedicated semiconductor investment instruments under its national industrial strategy, including a sector-focused vehicle supported by Bpifrance within the France 2030 framework. In parallel, CEA Investissement supports ventures emerging from strategic research domains with strong industrial potential. Private capital has also strengthened its position in the sector, notably through Ardian, which has launched a dedicated semiconductor investment strategy aimed at reinforcing European value-chain depth.

On the Irish side, Enterprise Ireland supports early-stage and scale-up firms, while IC-3 enhances technical readiness and integration into EU-level instruments. In this context, structured dialogue and potential co-investment between Bpifrance-backed vehicles and Enterprise Ireland — possibly alongside private platforms such as Ardian — could support cross-border semiconductor ventures and reinforce Europe’s internal industrial capacity.

Possible cooperation could therefore include coordinated scouting of semiconductor start-ups, improved cross-border visibility of deeptech investment opportunities, and alignment in preparation for participation in IPCEIs or Horizon Europe projects. Rather than duplicating national schemes, the objective would be to facilitate capital circulation and structured project formation within the European semiconductor ecosystem.

A distributed European strategy

Europe’s semiconductor resilience will not emerge from a single national champion. It will emerge from interconnected nodes capable of aligning research, industrialisation and funding instruments across borders.

France’s roadmap emphasises industrial depth, packaging capability and structured cluster coordination. Ireland’s IC-3 emphasises coordination, SME enablement and integration into European infrastructures. These approaches reinforce one another within a distributed European model.

IC-3 does not redefine Europe’s semiconductor balance overnight. What it does is position Ireland more clearly within Europe’s industrial reconfiguration. It strengthens Ireland’s capacity to act not only as a host of global investment, but as a structured contributor to Europe’s semiconductor sovereignty agenda.

In a sector defined by interdependence, that clarity of positioning is itself strategic.